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as in Nutt v. Carson, for misrepresentation and concealment of the
tort, as distinct from the mistreatment itself; or, in the alternative,
that the doctrine of equitable estoppel be allowed in such cases in
order that the plaintiff receive the legal redress to which he is
entitled.
MICHAEL HONOHAN

EXCLUSIVE ZONING

-

A PROHIBITION OF RESIDENCES FROM

INDUSTRLAL AND COIMERCIAL ZONES

Plaintiff purchased property in a commercially zoned district in
which both residential and commercial uses were permitted. His application for a permit to build a residential development on the property was rejected because of rear yard deficiencies. Between the time
of rejection, and correction of the deficiencies by the plaintiff, the
zoning ordinance of defendant city was amended to prohibit residences in districts other than those designated as dwelling house districts. Plaintiff's second application for a building permit met all
specifications except the provision of the amended ordinance. When
it, too, was rejected, plaintiff brought a mandamus action.
The lower court granted mandamus and ordered issuance of the
permit to plaintiff. Its decision was based upon the unconstitutionality of the exclusive zoning amendment and on the vested right to
build which plaintiff had acquired prior to the passage of the amendment. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the issuance of mandamus on the basis of plaintiff's vested rights.' Plaintiff acquired
these vested rights through a substantial change in his monetary position as a result of justified reliance upon the probability of the issuance of the building permit if he fulfilled the requirements in effect
upon the date of his application.2 However, the state supreme court
overruled the lower court's decision on the exclusive zoning amendment by declaring such zoning to be within the state's police power
and, therefore, constitutional.
The state police power has traditionally been exercised to protect
the health and welfare of the people. It enables the state to control
the close intermingling of people within its boundaries, so that the
rights of each individual are reasonably consistent and free from
conflict with those of his neighbors. When there is a conflict, the
state police power must regulate for the good of the community. The
decision in the Skokie case recognized the inevitable nuisances which
1. People ex rel. Skokie Town House Builders, Inc. v. Village of Morton Grove, 16 Ill.
2d
183, 157 N.E.2d 33 (1959).
2. Plaintiff purchased the land for $26,000 and paid $1,830 for building permits.

1960]

RECENT DECISIONS

will arise if a residence and an industry are allowed to grow up side
by side. The decision upholds the state's police power to zone exclusively in all areas, thereby allowing the home and industry to grow
up free from the problems which each imposes upon the other. As
logical as this may seem, it is a radical departure from past thinking.
Building regulation has grown up under the concept of pyramidal
or cumulative zoning. Under this theory, residential uses, the socalled higher uses, were placed at the top of the pyramid. They were
the most restricted. Going down the pyramid to commercial uses and
to industrial uses on the bottom, the pyramidal theory permitted all
higher uses to be constructed within any area zoned for lower uses.
As a result, industrial and commercial uses were excluded from residential districts, but residential uses were permitted anywhere. Until very recently, this has been the accepted approach to zoning.
The idea of exclusive zoning as applied to industrial and commercial districts was presented in a 1912 Frankfort, Germany zoning
ordinance.' It forbade residences in manufacturing districts to protect dwellings from the nuisances of industry. However, the Frankfort idea gained little acceptance, and the idea of exclusive industrial
and commercial zoning faded into the background until the late
1940's. 4 By that time city planners were becoming increasingly convinced that exclusive industrial and commercial zoning was a planning necessity. As the number of such ordinances is rapidly increasing, more and more courts are going to be faced with the problem
presented in the Skokie case.5
In 1956, a California district court of appeal handed down the
first United States decision dearly upholding exclusive industrial zoning.' The owners of land in Contra Costa County, California,
sought a residential building permit in an area zoned for heavy industry. The court rejected the application and upheld exclusive industrial zoning on the basis that it was a legitimate exercise of the state
police power to protect public health and welfare under conditions
of modern life. However, the basis for the decision was that the
proposed residential construction would be surrounded by heavy industry and the subdivision injuriously affected. While the court upheld exclusive industrial zoning, the reasoning of the decision was not
based on protecting industry. The residential higher use continued
to be the solitary beneficiary of zoning protection.
3.

PLANNING ADVISORY SERVIcE, INFORmATION REPORT No. 91 (1956).
4. URBAN LAND INsmTE TECHICAL BULLTN No. 10 (1948).
5. In Ohio, the question of the validity of exclusive industrial zoning came up for the first
time in State ex rel. Ronald, Inc. v. City of Willoughby, 170 Ohio St. 39, 161 N.E.2d 890
(1959). The plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus to compel issuance of a building permit
for a single frame dwelling in an area exclusively zoned for light industry. The Ohio Supreme
Court ruled that the plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies and dismissed the
mandamus action without ruling on the validity of the exclusive industrial zoning ordinance.
6. Roney v. Board of Supervisors of Contra Costa County, 138 Cal. App. 2d 740, 292 P.2d
529 (1956).
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In light of this historical protection of residential uses and the
corresponding lack of protection for commercial and industrial uses,
the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in the Skokie case is significant.
In upholding the constitutionality of the amendment, the court not
only recognized exclusive industrial and commercial zoning, but it
based its reasoning on the protection of industry and commercial establishments. In doing so it has given a new dignity to industrial and
commercial zones. Industry and commerce have good reason to be
protected from residences, just as residences have good reason to be
protected from industry and commerce. The state's police power to
protect the public welfare is just as correctly applied to preventing
homes from being built in an area where they will hinder industrial
expansion, as it is applied to preventing people from going into an
area where their health may be impaired.7 The California court in
the Roney case recognized only the hazards to family living. The
Skokie case recognized the fact that industrial or commercial efficiency and expansion are hampered by allowing residences within industrial and commercial zones. This is a liberal step toward exclusive zoning in every district.
The court added one word of warning which should be kept in
mind when exclusive zoning ordinances are under consideration.8 The
present character of a district may make an exclusive zoning ordinance unreasonable and discriminatory. If there is no immediate
need of land for industrial or commercial use, residences should not
be prohibited. In areas where urban centers are expanding, infant
residential suburbs often set aside land for future industrial use.
Many of these areas are not actually suited for industry, and there
is little likelihood that industrial development will ever take place.
In such situations exclusive industrial and commercial ordinances may
not be appropriate.
The importance of the decision in the Skokie case rests upon the
transition which it makes from the traditional concept of pyramidal
zoning to the idea that exclusive zoning will increase the efficiency
and desirability of each district. This recognizes that all uses are important since each has a particular function. The public health and
welfare of the community will best be served by separating industrial,
commercial, and residential districts. When this is achieved each
will be able to operate more effectively and efficiently without interference from conflicting uses.
PHILLIP ALLYN RANNEY
7. A good discussion of the purpose of the state police power is dearly set forth in State v.
Gordon, 143 Conn. 698, 702, 125 A.2d 477, 480 (1956).
8. People ex rel. Skokie Town House Builders, Inc. v. Village of Morton Grove, 16 Ill. 2d
183, 157 N.E.2d 33 (1959); see, e.g., Corthouts v. Town of Newington, 139 Cal. App. 2d
740, 292 P.2d 529 (1953); Comer v. City of Dearborn, 342 Mich. 471, 70 N.W.2d 813
(1955).

